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Abstract

Using inflation forecasts from the OECD Economic Outlook as proxy measures of inflation expectations,
we examine the impact of inflation expectations on the sacrifice ratio for 20 OECD countries. The
regression analysis considers four different empirical models of the determinants of the sacrifice ratio
typically found in the existing literature. The impact of the level of inflation expectations is negative
and significant, implying that a higher level of expected inflation is associated with lower sacrifice
ratios. This result is consistent with the theoretical role of nominal wage and price rigidities in that
reductions in wage and price stickiness diminish the tradeoffs between disinflations and output losses.
Interaction effects indicate that higher levels of expected inflation allow policymakers to pursue ‘cold

turkey’ inflation reductions even more aggressively. The effect of the change in inflation expectations
is negative and significant, implying that faster adjusting inflation expectations are associated with
lower sacrifice ratios.

INTRODUCTION

Using inflation forecasts from the OECD Economic Outlook as proxy measures of inflation expectations,
we examine the impact of inflation expectations on the sacrifice ratio for 20 OECD countries. The
regression analysis considers four different empirical models of the determinants of the sacrifice ratio
typically found in the existing literature. The impact of the level of inflation expectations is negative
and significant, implying that a higher level of expected inflation is associated with lower sacrifice
ratios. This result is consistent with the theoretical role of nominal wage and price rigidities in that
reductions in wage and price stickiness diminish the tradeoffs between disinflations and output losses.
Interaction effects indicate that higher levels of expected inflation allow policymakers to pursue 'cold
turkey' inflation reductions even more aggressively. The effect of the change in inflation expectations is
negative and significant, implying that faster adjusting inflation expectations are associated with lower
sacrifice ratios.
There have been a number of studies on the determinants of the sacrifice ratio or the tradeoff
between output and inflation. The sacrifice ratio was first quantified by Ball ([ 4]) to examine the
output loss associated with a disinflationary episode. Early studies focused on the relationship
between the sacrifice ratio and the speed of the disinflation, to determine whether a gradual
disinflation or 'cold turkey' disinflation resulted in a lower output loss. Subsequent studies considered
economy‐wide characteristics such as the degree of trade openness, central bank independence, wage
stickiness, the exchange rate regime or inflation targeting, and exchange‐rate pass‐through, to name a
few.
Theoretical models on ( 1) price/wage stickiness; ( 2) policymaking credibility/commitment; and ( 3)
macroeconomic variability introduced via policy actions suggest channels that link inflation
expectations, as well as the speed of adjustment of inflation expectations, to the inflation‐output
trade‐off. Limiting consideration to price and wage stickiness, we would a priori assume an estimated
negative relationship between expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio.
Once policy credibility effects are taken into account, however, the predicted sign of this relationship
becomes less obvious, as endogenously determined inflation expectations and the credibility of
macroeconomic policies can move together or in opposing directions. Empirical treatment of the
influence of policy credibility would, therefore, yield an ambiguous prediction for the relationship
between expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio.
In contrast, policy‐induced macroeconomic volatility, itself depending on policy credibility, impacts the
optimal degree of wage stickiness that leads to output losses from disinflations. Taking this channel, by
itself, into consideration suggests a positive relationship between expected inflation and the sacrifice
ratio. Overall, these three channels operating together through the macroeconomic policy process
suggest a likely positive relationship between expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio. Given some
degree of ambiguity, however, the relationship remains an empirical question, which is the motivation
for this study.

Using inflation forecasts from the OECD Economic Outlook as proxy measures of inflation expectations,
we examine the impact of the level of inflation expectations and changes in inflation expectations on
the sacrifice ratio for 20 OECD countries. The regression analysis considers four different empirical
models of the determinants of the sacrifice ratio typically found in the existing literature. The first sets
of regressions compare the impact of the level of inflation expectations prevailing at the beginning of a
disinflationary episode to the effect of initial, or peak inflation at the beginning of a disinflationary
period. The direct impact of the level of inflation expectations—or the total impact in models with
interaction terms—is negative and significant in all models, implying that a higher level of expected
inflation is associated with a lower sacrifice ratio. This result is consistent with the theoretical role of
nominal price and wage rigidities, in that reductions in wage and price stickiness diminish the tradeoffs
between disinflations and output losses. Interaction effects indicate that higher levels of expected
inflation, consistent with reduced wage and price stickiness, allow policymakers to pursue 'cold turkey'
inflation reductions even more aggressively.
The role of the level of inflation expectations, however, differ from initial inflation when considering a
model that includes a variable for central bank independence. We explore this difference by
considering mediation effects via the Sobel‐Goodman mediation test (Sobel, [25]). We find that initial
inflation is a mediator—that is, it carries some of the influence of central bank independence to the
sacrifice ratio. This suggests that a more independent central bank has the power to exploit the
inflation‐output tradeoff more when the level of inflation at the outset of a disinflation episode starts
from a high level. Results for the level of inflation expectations imply that inflation expectations are not
a mediator.
A second set of regression models examines the role of changes in inflation expectations that occur
over a disinflationary episode rather than the level of inflation expectations. Consistent with the results
for the level of expectations, the effect of the change in inflation expectations is negative and
significant in all four regression models, implying that faster‐adjusting inflation expectations are
associated with lower sacrifice ratios. Likewise, the interaction between changes in inflation
expectations and the length of the disinflation is negative and significant, indicating that faster‐
adjusting expectations allow policymakers to pursue disinflations even more quickly. In addition,
changes in inflation expectations also have a mediation effect in models that include a measure of
central‐bank independence. Since the level of expected inflation does not have a mediation effect,
whereas the change in expected inflation does, this implies that it is via a change in expectations that
central banks can alter output while disinflating. Put in a different way, part of the impact of lowering
inflation comes about through inducing a change in inflation expectations.
A final set of regressions combines ( 1) initial inflation and changes in inflation expectations and ( 2) the
level of inflation expectations and changes in inflation expectations. These results show that ( 1) initial
inflation and changes in inflation expectations have unique and statistically significant effects and that
( 2) the level of inflation expectations and the change in inflation expectations have unique and
statistically significant effects.
The following section examines alternative theoretical perspectives regarding the relationship between
expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio. Section 3 discusses the variables and data utilized to evaluate

this relationship. Section 4 describes the empirical models and results. Section 5 discusses key
implications and concludes by contemplating possible directions for future research.

THEORETICAL ASSESSMENT

Several theoretical rationales for how inflation expectations might be related to the sacrifice ratio are
summarized in Table 1. A direct channel involves nominal wage and price rigidities often suggested as
necessary for output losses to be associated with disinflations. Conceivable indirect channels operate
through the credibility of authorities' policies, arise from underlying reputations of those policymaking
authorities, or exist because of contributions of the authorities' policies to macroeconomic volatility.
Table 1. Proposed channels relating expected inflation to the sacrifice ratio
Channel
Direct:
Nominal Wage and
Price Rigidities

Indirect:
Macroeconomic
Policymaking

Analytical
framework

Predicted relationship and basic mechanism

Fischer (16);
Gray (20);
Taylor (26)

Negative association between expected inflation and the
sacrifice ratio: Lower nominal stickiness reduces the tradeoff
between disinflations and output, so higher expected
inflation that lessens nominal stickiness decreases the
sacrifice ratio.

Cukierman
(11); Drazen
(14)

Ambiguous association between expected inflation and the
sacrifice ratio: Increased variance of monetary control error
boosts expected inflation while increasing the output loss
from disinflations. Higher variance of the central bank's
preference weight on its employment objective reduces its
credibility, which raises expected inflation while increasing
the output loss from disinflations
Positive association between expected inflation and the
sacrifice ratio: If the central bank is tough and the private
sector is weak, expected inflation and the output loss from
disinflation fall to zero. If the central bank is weak and the
private sector is tough, expected inflation and the output
loss from disinflation both increase.
Positive association between expected inflation and the
sacrifice ratio: Fewer policy shocks and resulting higher
macroeconomic policy credibility lower expected inflation
and simultaneously reduce output losses from disinflations

Reputation of
Macroeconomic
Policymakers

Backus and
Driffill (2,3)

Policy Shocks, Policy
Credibility, and
Rigidities

Gray (21);
Gray and
Kandil (22)

The direct channel via nominal wage and price rigidities

A direct influence of nominal wage and price rigidities on the output losses associated with
disinflations is the most straightforward rationale for a relationship between expected inflation and
the sacrifice ratio. In traditional sticky‐wage/price models that followed on the heels of those proposed

by Fischer ([16]), Gray ([20]), and Taylor ([26]) and summarized within the Blinder and Mankiw ([ 9])
amalgamated 'archipelago‐economy' model, nominal rigidities naturally create conditions that yield a
short‐term Phillips‐curve tradeoff between the inflation rate and real GDP growth.
Although many economists abandoned these traditional models of wage and price rigidity because of
mismatches with predicted real wage dynamics, Ball ([ 5], [ 6]), Fuhrer and Moore ([18]), and Mankiw
([23]) have shown that basic forward‐looking New Keynesian models can adequately explain neither
inflation persistence nor output losses from disinflations. Ascari and Ropele ([ 1]) show within a New
Keynesian framework that a 'cold‐turkey' disinflation can generate disinflation losses consistent with
estimated sacrifice ratios when exogenously specified degrees of wage‐ and price‐inflation indexation
happen to lie within appropriate ranges. Nevertheless, consistent with Ball's original arguments,
enabling such models to generate disinflationary output losses usually requires the introduction of
separate policy‐credibility considerations; see, for instance, Erceg and Levin ([15]) and Goodfriend and
King ([19]). We shall return to this issue of traditional versus forward‐looking New Keynesian
perspectives on the sacrifice ratio in Section 5.
Within the traditional nominal‐stickiness models, reductions in wage and price stickiness yielded by
higher actual and expected rates of product and input price inflation generate a diminished tradeoff
between disinflations and aggregate output. Thus, in the presence of nominal wage and price
rigidities, higher expected inflation is associated with a lower sacrifice ratio.

The indirect macroeconomic policymaking channel

Barro and Gordon ([ 7]) explained how positive mean inflation rates tend to arise in settings in which
central banks lack credibility to commitments to restrain inflation. The substantial political economy
literature that followed suggests channels through which the policy process could simultaneously
influence expected inflation and output losses generated by disinflations. In his review of this
substantial literature, Drazen ([14], Chapter 6) notes the importance of differentiating between the
credibility of macroeconomic policies versus the credibility of policymakers themselves. We here focus
on how the credibility of macroeconomic policymaking can impinge upon the relationship between
expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio. We shall contemplate the reputational effects in the
following subsection.
In Cukierman's ([11], Chapter 9) classic study of key determinants of central bank credibility, low
central credibility is measured by a summary statistic based on negative absolute deviations of planned
money growth from the public's expectation of planned money growth. The value of this credibility
measure depends negatively on the variance of the central bank's monetary control error; the variance
of innovations to its employment objective; and the slope of a Phillips curve relationship relating the
deviation of employment from its natural level to the deviation of inflation from its expected level. In
Cukierman's model, the endogenously‐determined expected inflation of private agents is higher when
the variance of the monetary control error is greater. A rise in the variance of the monetary control
error, however, pushes down the value of Cukierman's credibility measure and hence raises the cost of
a disinflation. Hence, when the central bank experiences a larger variance of the monetary control
error, the result in Cukierman's model is higher mean inflation at the same time that lower credibility,
and hence a higher output loss, results from a disinflation.

Nevertheless, Cukierman's credibility measure also depends on the variance of innovations to the
central bank's employment objective, which could rise or fall over time with appointments of new
leaders, alterations in the legal structure of the central bank, or successful applications of political
pressures on those leaders. A higher value of the variance of this objective effectively pushes up the
overall net relative weight on inflation in the central bank's decision‐making process, which causes the
agents' endogenous inflation expectation to decline. At the same time, an increase in this variance
boosts expected deviations of planned money growth from agents' conditional expectation of money
growth. Central bank credibility declines, and consequently a higher output loss results from a given
disinflation. Thus, when the central bank experiences a greater variance of innovations to its
employment objective, lower expected inflation is associated with higher output losses from
disinflations.
Comparing these two examples indicates that the net relationship between expected inflation and
output losses from disinflations depends on underlying parameters that simultaneously influence both
variables. Hence, taking into account policy credibility considerations yields a theoretically ambiguous
relationship between observed values of expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio.

The indirect policymaker reputation channel

Barro and Gordon ([ 8]) investigated how a monetary authority might establish an anti‐inflation
reputation to limit the inflationary bias of discretionary policymaking. Backus and Driffill ([ 2],[ 3])
famously pursued this idea within an explicit dynamic‐game‐theoretic reputational model. In their
model, a central bank known to have a tough anti‐inflation stance can credibly commit to low (or zero)
inflation and thereby ensure that the output cost of a disinflation will be very low (and potentially
zero). Backus and Driffill contemplate central banks that are either tough or weak in their anti‐
inflationary stances and also consider private sectors that are tough or weak in terms of giving in on
adjustment of their inflation expectations and settings for the nominal wage rate.
Backus and Driffill ([ 3]) consider a special case of their reputational model in which the central bank is
tough and the private sector is weak. They verify that actual and expected inflation and the output loss
from a disinflation both fall toward zero, so that lower expected inflation is associated with
a lower sacrifice ratio. They find that in the case of a weak central banker but a tough private sector,
both expected inflation and the output cost of disinflating are high, so that higher expected inflation is
associated with a higher sacrifice ratio. Thus, these two reputational cases imply a positive association
between expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio.

The indirect macroeconomic variability channel

Considerable evidence—see Taylor ([27]), for example—indicates that reduced inflation volatility
owing to diminished aggregate demand variability is directly associated with lower mean inflation,
reduced inflation forecast errors, and decreased inflation expectations. In addition, the theory of
optimal length of nominal contracts developed by Gray ([21]) indicates that a reduction in aggregate
demand variability reduces optimal contract length. To the extent that greater policy credibility
reduces volatility of aggregate demand, the degree of nominal wage and price stickiness should
decrease.

Thus, as noted by Gray and Kandil ([22]), greater macroeconomic stability and increased wage and
price flexibility can simultaneously result when policymaking reduces aggregate demand volatility. This
insight yields the final indirect channel through which inflation expectations can be related to the
sacrifice ratio. On the one hand, greater macroeconomic stability brought about by a more credible
policy process implies both lower inflation volatility and hence mean inflation. On the other hand, the
enhanced stability of aggregate demand associated with greater policy credibility also reduces nominal
contract length and thereby boosts the flexibilities of wages and prices and tends to reduce output
losses resulting from disinflations. Taken together, this final policy credibility channel thereby yields a
positive relationship between expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio. This last channel operating
through the policy credibility process thereby suggests that higher expected inflation potentially could
be associated with a higher sacrifice ratio, thereby implying a positive relationship between the two
variables.

Summary

Economists typically appeal to wage and price rigidities to rationalize the observation of output losses
that accompany disinflations, which, since Ball's ([ 4]) original contribution, have been measured with
sacrifice ratios. If we were to limit ourselves solely to this basic explanation for the observation of
positive sacrifice ratios, we would predict that higher expected inflation accompanying an increased
actual mean inflation rate would be associated with a lower sacrifice ratio. That is, we would anticipate
observing an estimated negative relationship between expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio in the
available data.
Once the potential importance of various policy credibility effects is taken into account, however, the
predicted sign of this relationship becomes less obvious. Endogenously‐determined inflation
expectations and the credibility of macroeconomic policymaking, which in turn influences the output
losses from disinflations, can move in tandem or in opposing directions, depending on magnitudes of
underlying structural parameters. Hence, consideration of influence of the credibility of policies yields
an ambiguous prediction for the relationship between expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio.
Although dynamic‐game‐theoretic models of policymaker reputation could be made sufficiently
complicated to generate a negative relationship, the implication of accounting for reputational
considerations is that expected inflation is more likely to be positively related to the sacrifice ratio.
Finally, macroeconomic volatility induced by policymaking, which depends on the overall credibility of
the policy process, impinges on the optimal durations of nominal contracts that motivate output losses
from disinflations. Taking this channel into consideration predicts a positive relationship between
expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio. Overall, taking into account all three indirect channels
operating through the macroeconomic policy process yields the prediction of a likely positive sign for
the relationship between expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio, although some scope for ambiguity
is present.
Overall, taking into account the various channels in combination yields a theoretically uncertain
relationship between expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio. Consequently, in the next section we
turn to the data for guidance regarding the relationship that actually exists between these two
variables.

DATA

Much of our empirical data comes from the meta‐study of the determinants of the sacrifice ratio by
Daniels, Mazumder, and VanHoose ([12]). These authors derive their sacrifice ratio data from Bowdler
([10]) and extend his data set to cover 1973–2004. The primary data source for that data is the
International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics. Focusing on this dataset, we can
directly compare our results with the various models in their study. The data set covers 20 OECD
countries for the period 1973 through 2004 for a total of 69 usable observations.[ 1]
The sacrifice ratio (SAC) is the dependent variable in our regression models and is based on the seminal
work of Ball ([ 4]). The sacrifice ratio is measured as the ratio of actual less trend output, to the amount
of disinflation during a disinflationary period. Using the centered eight‐quarter moving average of
actual quarterly inflation, an inflation peak (trough) is a period in which trend inflation is higher (lower)
than in the previous two years. A disinflation episode is then defined as a period of time beginning with
a peak and ending at a trough, where trend inflation declines by at least 1.5 percent.
To measure trend output, it is assumed that output is at trend at an inflation peak and returns to its
trend one year after the end of a disinflationary episode. Trend output is assumed to grow log‐linearly
between the peak and trough. The numerator of the sacrifice ratio, therefore, is the sum of the
differences between trend output, and the log of actual output. The denominator of the sacrifice ratio
is simply the amount of disinflation during an episode.
Independent variables begin with the speed of the disinflation as measured by the length (Length) of
the disinflation episode in years. Peak inflation (Peak) is the initial level of inflation at the start of a
disinflation episode. The relative inflation loss (RInfLoss) is measured as the amount of disinflation over
an episode relative to the initial level of inflation at the start of the episode (Peak). We use this
measure to capture diminishing returns to inflation reductions (e.g., it is likely that the output loss
associated with a 2 percent inflation reduction when initial inflation is 10 percent would be smaller
than the output loss associated with a 2 percent inflation loss when initial inflation is, say, 3 percent).
The degree of trade openness (Openness) follows Romer ([24]) who focuses only in the cross‐sectional
variance of this measure so as to reduce potential endogeneity. His measure, therefore, is the period‐
average of the ratio of imports to GDP. Our measure of Central Bank Independence (CBI) follows
Daniels, Nourzad, and VanHoose ([13]) who employ data from Franzese ([17]). To capture expected
inflation (ExpInf), we use the inflation forecasts from various issues of the OECD Economic Outlook.[ 2]
Specifically, we use the next‐year inflation forecast from the December issue of the Economic
Outlook immediately prior to a disinflationary episode. This year‐ahead forecast is based on the most
recent, but incomplete, inflation information. The relative change in expected inflation (RelΔExpInf) is
simply the difference between the OECD inflation forecast at the end of a disinflationary episode and
the measure of expected inflation, ExpInf, at the beginning of the episode relative to the level of
inflation expectations, ExpInf. Hence, the relative change in inflation expectations is consistent with
the relative change in inflation, RInfLoss.
Table 2 provides a correlation matrix for all the independent variables. The key variables of interest for
this study are Peak, RInfLoss, ExpInf, and RelΔExpInf. Among the four variables, the only statistically
significant pairwise correlations are between Peak and ExpInf, which have a positive correlation that is

statistically significant at the 5 percent level, and between Peak and RInfLoss which have a negative
correlation that is statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 2. Correlation matrix between independent variables
Length
Peak
RInfLoss Openness CBI
ExpInf RelΔExpInf
Length
1
Peak
0.041
1
RInfLoss
0.523*** −0.200*
1
Openness −0.005
−0.017
−0.097
1
CBI
−0.053
−0.317*** 0.105
−0.032
1
ExpInf
0.080
0.808*** −0.100
0.081
−0.220* 1
RelΔExpInf −0.003
−0.177
−0.055
0.167
−0.106 −0.107 1
1 *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at the 10 percent level.

EMPIRICAL MODEL AND RESULTS

We turn to our main empirical analyses, in which we regress the sacrifice ratio on various determinants
that are considered standard in the literature. Aside from the length of disinflationary episodes, the
amount of disinflation is also frequently included in typical sacrifice ratio regressions, such as in Ball
([ 4]). As stated in the previous section we define relative inflation loss as the amount of inflation loss
divided by inflation at the onset of an episode, where this transformed variable has lower correlations
with the other regressors. Hence, in Model 1 of each table of results reported below, we use a fairly
typical specification of regressing the sacrifice ratio on a constant, trade openness, the length of the
disinflation episode, and the relative inflation loss. Because of the correlation
between Peak and ExpInf, we first add Peak (initial inflation). As noted by Ball ([ 4]), theory suggests
that the sacrifice ratio should be lower with higher initial inflation.[ 3] Hence, we expect this variable to
have a negative relationship with the sacrifice ratio.
We next add to the first model the interaction between the length of the episode and Peak (Model 2),
where we test to see whether initial inflation matters when considered alongside the speed of
disinflation. In Model 3, we employ the Daniels et al. ([13]) model that tests central bank
independence, while Model 4 modifies this slightly by adding the interaction between central bank
independence and initial inflation.
In subsection 4.1 that follows, we focus on evaluating the evidence concerning the fundamental issue
of what the data tell us about the actual relationship between the level of the expected inflation rate
and the sacrifice ratio vis‐à‐vis conflicting predictions of the alternative theories discussed in Section 2.
In subsection 4.2, we seek to delve more deeply into how other independent variables that might
affect the sacrifice ratio affect nature of this relationship. In addition, we explore empirically the
potential of differential sacrifice‐ratio effects of the level of inflation expectations vis‐à‐vis changes in
inflation expectations that have not generally been addressed explicitly in the theoretical literature.

Results for initial inflation and for the level of expected inflation

The results for our four basic regression models and focusing separately on peak inflation and expected
inflation can be seen in Tables 3 and 4, respectively, in which we utilize pooled OLS with robust

standard errors (clustered at the country level). As is well documented in the literature, in all four
columns of Table 3, we see that the length of a disinflationary episode is a positive and statistically
significant determinant of the sacrifice ratio. In other words, longer disinflations are costlier in terms of
more lost GDP. This, in turn, is what motivates the idea of 'cold‐turkey' disinflation, for which fast
reductions in the level of trend inflation are often encouraged. In all specifications we find that trade
openness is a negative and significant determinant of SAC, as argued in Daniels et al. ([13]), in which in
a more open economy, a real depreciation causes the price of foreign goods and services to rise
proportionately faster than that of domestic goods and services, causing higher inflation. Indeed, a real
depreciation which raises domestic firms' costs leads to a larger increase in domestic prices for any rise
in domestic output. While relative inflation loss in Table 3 always produces the expected negative sign,
we never obtain statistical significance for this variable. In Models 3 and 4, we find the coefficients on
central bank independence to be positive but not a statistically significant determinant of the sacrifice
ratio. In Models 1 and 3 (models without an interaction term), the coefficient on Peak is negative and
statistically significant, in line with a priori expectations. In Models 2 and 4, the total effect of Peak is
negative and statistically significant.
Table 3. Sacrifice ratio regressions with peak inflation
Openness
Length
RInfLoss
Peak
Length × Peak
CBI
CBI × Peak
Constant
Total effect of Peak
Observations
R2
Adj. R2

Model 1
−0.026*** (0.007)
0.545*** (0.097)
−0.439 (0.676)
−0.069** (0.027)

0.755 (0.635)
69
0.375
0.336

Model 2
−0.027*** (0.007)
1.014*** (0.315)
−0.722 (0.691)
0.077 (0.067)
−0.034* (0.017)

−1.018 (1.159)
−0.075*** (0.025)
69
0.429
0.383

Model 3
−0.025*** (0.008)
0.553*** (0.099)
−0.496 (0.681)
−0.061** (0.028)

Model 4
−0.025*** (0.007)
0.549*** (0.100)
−0.501 (0.681)
−0.033 (0.050)

0.826 (0.560)

1.531 (1.367)
−0.082 (0.129)
0.056 (0.750)
−0.070** (0.032)
69
0.384
0.324

0.295 (0.632)
69
0.382
0.333

In Table 4, we repeat this exercise, substituting the level of inflation expectations, ExpInf for Peak. In
cases in which the level of expected inflation is used alone in the sacrifice ratio regression (Models 1
and 3), we find a statistically significant negative coefficient, albeit it with a small magnitude, in which
we obtain coefficients in the region of about −0.06. This thus agrees with the side of the theory that
argues that higher expected inflation tends to be associated with lower sacrifice ratios. Namely, the
nominal wage and price rigidity channel outlined in section 2.1, agrees with this finding, whereby
reductions in wage and price stickiness caused by higher rates of output and input price inflation, leads
to diminished tradeoffs between reductions in inflation and total output.
Table 4. Sacrifice ratio regressions with expected inflation
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Openness
Length
RInfLoss
ExpInf
Length × ExpInf
CBI
CBI × ExpInf
Constant
Total effect of ExpInf
Observations
R2
Adj. R2

−0.023** (0.008)
0.534*** (0.101)
−0.189 (0.611)
−0.067** (0.031)

0.394 (0.547)
69
0.362
0.322

−0.023*** (0.008)
0.997** (0.371)
−0.600 (0.683)
0.107 (0.092)
−0.041* (0.024)

−1.269 (1.192)
−0.078** (0.031)
69
0.413
0.367

−0.023** (0.008)
0.546*** (0.103)
−0.305 (0.619)
−0.059* (0.031)

−0.021** (0.008)
0.521*** (0.106)
−0.262 (0.564)
0.034 (0.044)

1.050* (0.570)

2.652** (1.046)
−0.254** (0.112)
−0.699 (0.509)
−0.081** (0.032)
69
0.389
0.330

−0.122 (0.540)
69
0.374
0.324

In Model 2, we find a negative and significant coefficient for the interaction between length and
expected inflation. This tells us that inflation expectations condition the length of disinflationary
episodes, which we always find to have a positive effect on the sacrifice ratio. In particular, a negative
coefficient for the interaction terms shows that quickly adjusting expectations allows policymakers to
pursue reductions in trend inflation all the more aggressively. Also notice that the fit of the model, as
seen by the adjusted‐R2, rises substantially—by about 30 percent—when we add the interaction term
from Model 1 to get the results seen in Model 2. In this model, we also consider the total effect of
expected inflation on SAC, by combining the coefficients on the interaction term with expected
inflation (assuming length to be equal to its mean value), and we see that the overall impact of
expected inflation on output losses of disinflation is negative and statistically significant. Hence, the
results for Peak and ExpInf are very similar across Models 1 and 2.
Models 3 and 4 of Table 4, however, provides differing results than Models 3 and 4 for Peak. When
inflation expectations are substituted for initial inflation, the coefficient on CBI is positive and
statistically significant (albeit at the 10 percent level) in Model 3 and is positive and statistically
significant at the 5 percent level in Model 4. Further, the interaction terms between CBI and ExpInf is
negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. This latter result indicates that a more
independent central bank that embarks upon a tightening of monetary policy, beginning from a high
level of expected inflation, is able to lower the output losses incurred during this disinflation episode.
In other words, this gives some credence to the rational expectations notion that disinflation can be
'costless' if the central bank makes a credible announcement of their goal of reducing inflation, if one
uses central bank independence as a proxy for credibility. This finding is tempered, however, when we
consider the total effect of CBI on the sacrifice ratio and find it to be an effect that is statistically equal
to zero. Similar to the results for Peak, the total effect of expected inflation on the sacrifice ratio (while
also including its interaction with central bank independence) is negative and statistically significant.

Further exploration of the empirical relationship among expected inflation, the sacrifice
ratio, and other explanatory variables
Our above results indicate unambiguously that, consistent with theories based on nominal stickiness,
the empirical relationship between the level of expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio is negative.

These results also suggest, however, that interactions exist among inflation expectations and other
independent variables that influence the sacrifice ratio. In the remainder of this section, we seek to
explore more fully the nature of these interactions. In the process, we shall demonstrate that
the level of inflation expectations and changes in inflation expectations have individually unique effects
on the sacrifice ratio.
First, note that Models 2 and 4 of Tables and indicate that both initial inflation and the level of inflation
expectations have a moderating effect on, or condition, the impact of the length of the disinflation
period and central bank independence (as captured by the interaction terms). Models 3 and 4,
however, indicate that initial inflation and the level of inflation expectations affect the influence
of CBI on the SAC differently. We explore this further by considering mediation effects. That is, do
initial inflation and inflation expectations carry the influence of CBI on the sacrifice ratio? To do this,
we first test and find that: ( 1) CBI statistically significantly affects the Peak; ( 2) CBI statistically
significantly affects the SAC in absences of Peak; ( 3) Peak has a statistically significant effect on
the SAC, and; ( 4) the impact or coefficient on CBI declines with the inclusion of Peak. Following this,
results for the Sobel‐Goodman mediation test show that the overall coefficient of CBI is 1.531
(consistent with Model 4) but that 0.526, or 39 percent, of this total effect is an indirect effect carried
by Peak. Hence, Peak is a mediating variable that carries a statistically significant (p‐value of 0.023)
indirect effect of CBI on the SAC. This has important policy implications for central banks, which may
be able to exploit the tradeoff between inflation and output further if the level of peak inflation is high
at the start of a disinflationary episode.
We also test the level of inflation expectations as a mediator. Though it passes the first four tests
described above, the indirect effect is not statistically significant (p‐value of 0.137).[ 4]
One could easily argue that the way in which expected inflation should be incorporated into a sacrifice
ratio regression is by examining the change in expected inflation, rather than the level of expected
inflation, over the course of a disinflation episode. Therefore, in Table 5, we reproduce the previous
regressions except with the relative change in expected inflation over the course of the disinflation
rather than the level of expected inflation or peak. The results of Models 1 and 3 are similar to the
level of expected inflation in that the coefficient on RelΔExpInf is negative and statistically significant
and the coefficient on CBI is positive and statistically significant in Model 3. We also find the relative
change in the expected inflation coefficient to be positive in Model 2 of Table 5. Nevertheless,
consistent with our results regarding the level of inflation expectations in subsection 4.1, the total
effect of the change in expected inflation on the sacrifice ratio remains negative and significant.
Table 5. Sacrifice ratio regressions with relative change in expected inflation
Openness
Length
RInfLoss
RelΔExpInf

Model 1
−0.021***
(0.006)
0.506***
(0.091)
0.006 (0.567)
−0.039***
(0.013)

Model 2
−0.018**
(0.006)
0.537***
(0.091)
−0.059 (0.577)
0.031* (0.015)

Model 3
−0.021***
(0.006)
0.524***
(0.094)
−0.159 (0.615)
−0.036**
(0.015)

Model 4
−0.021***
(0.006)
0.528***
(0.096)
−0.128 (0.621)
0.015 (0.052)

Length × RelΔExpInf
CBI
CBI × RelΔExpInf
Constant
Total effect of
RelΔExpInf
Observations
R2
Adj. R2

−0.023***
(0.005)
−0.118 (0.500)
69
0.352
0.312

−0.238 (0.517)
−0.071***
(0.010)
69
0.360
0.309

1.220** (0.548)
−0.648 (0.521)
69
0.369
0.319

1.390** (0.646)
−0.106 (0.114)
−0.792 (0.562)
−0.033* (0.016)
69
0.370
0.309

Thus, whether we employ the level of expected inflation or the change in expected inflation as an
independent variable, we find it has a negative and statistically significant effect on the sacrifice ratio.
This tells us that a disinflation that successfully brings down the expected rate of inflation that prevails
in an economy is one that has lower costs in terms of output losses.[ 5]
We also consider whether the change in inflation expectations might carry the influence of CBI to the
sacrifice ratio in a similar manner as initial inflation. That is, does RelΔExpInf serve as both a
moderating variable (as shown by the interaction term in Model 4) and a mediating variable? Following
the process described above, RelΔExpInf is indeed a mediating variable. The total effect (coefficient)
of CBI on the SAC is 1.390 as shown in Model 3 of Table with 10 percent of the effect (0.1309) being a
statistically significant indirect effect carried by RelΔExpInf. Therefore, the change in expected inflation
is a mediating variable, whereas we reported earlier that the level of expected inflation was not. This
indicates that central banks are changing the output costs of disinflation through their impact on
inflation expectations. In other words, part of the effect on output of reducing the trend inflation rate
comes about through changing the expected rate of inflation.

Results for tests for individual or unique effects

To this point, our regressions have considered initial inflation and the relative change in inflation
expectations separately and the initial level of expected inflation and the relative change in inflation
expectations separately. Tables 6 and 7 provide results when the models include both variables. The
results provided in Table 6 show that Peak is statistically significant across all models and RelΔExpInf is
statistically significant in Models 1 and 3, and that the total effect of RelΔExpInf is statistically
significant in Models 2 and 4. We conclude, therefore, that Peak and RelΔExpInf have unique effects
on the sacrifice ratio.
Table 6. Sacrifice ratio regressions with peak and relative change in expected inflation
Openness
Length
RInfLoss

Model 1
−0.021***
(0.006)
0.558***
(0.100)
−0.610 (0.628)

Model 2
−0.018**
(0.007)
0.599***
(0.102)
−0.716 (0.652)

Model 3
−0.021***
(0.006)
0.562***
(0.101)
−0.638 (0.638)

Model 4
−0.021***
(0.006)
0.561***
(0.101)
−0.655 (0.643)

Peak
RelΔExpInf
Length × RelΔExpInf
CBI
CBI × RelΔExpInf
Constant
Total effect of
RelΔExpInf
Observations
R2
Adj. R2

−0.082***
(0.024)
−0.051***
(0.016)

0.909 (0.547)
69
0.416
0.369

−0.085***
(0.025)
0.036* (0.020)
−0.029***
(0.007)
0.796 (0.581)
−0.092***
(0.014)
69
0.427
0.372

−0.077***
(0.025)
−0.049***
(0.017)

−0.077***
(0.026)
−0.067 (0.056)

0.514 (0.570)

0.447 (0.687)
0.036 (0.124)
0.681 (0.638)
−0.050***
(0.015)
69
0.418
0.352

0.617 (0.531)
69
0.418
0.362

Table 7 repeats this exercise, substituting the level of expected inflation, ExpInf, for Peak. Similar to
the results in Table 6, ExpInf is statistically significant across all models, RelΔExpInf is statistically
significant in Models 1 through 3, and the total effect of RelΔExpInf is statistically significant in Models
2 and 4. Again we conclude that ExpInf and RelΔExpInf have unique effects on the sacrifice ratio.
Table 7. Sacrifice ratio regressions with expected inflation and relative change in expected inflation
Openness
Length
RInfLoss
ExpInf
RelΔExpInf
Length × RelΔExpInf
CBI
CBI × RelΔExpInf
Constant
Total effect of
RelΔExpInf
Observations
R2
Adj. R2

Model 1
−0.019***
(0.006)
0.542***
(0.104)
−0.291 (0.571)
−0.076**
(0.027)
−0.046**
(0.017)

0.454 (0.489)
69
0.395
0.347

Model 2
−0.014**
(0.006)
0.588***
(0.105)
−0.407 (0.585)
−0.082***
(0.028)
0.050***
(0.016)
−0.032***
(0.006)

Model 3
−0.019***
(0.006)
0.551***
(0.105)
−0.378 (0.584)
−0.069**
(0.028)
−0.043**
(0.018)

Model 4
−0.019***
(0.006)
0.552***
(0.105)
−0.369 (0.583)
−0.068**
(0.030)
−0.030 (0.066)

0.843 (0.583)

0.336 (0.520)
−0.091***
(0.012)
69
0.409
0.352

0.0362 (0.488)

0.890 (0.730)
−0.027 (0.138)
−0.006 (0.598)
−0.042**
(0.018)
69
0.402
0.334

69
0.402
0.345

CONCLUSION

Contemplation of alternative theoretical rationales for a relationship between expected inflation and
the sacrifice ratio yields an uncertain net prediction. On the one hand, consideration of nominal wage
and price rigidities as the standard motivation for the observation of positive sacrifice ratios leads to a
predicted negative relationship between expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio. On the other hand,
taking into account the influence of channels emanating from the macroeconomic policy process
suggests that a positive relationship between expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio is likely,
although some scope for ambiguity is present.
Our generally consistent empirical finding of the existence of a negative relationship between the level
of (and changes in) expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio has two important implications. The most
obvious of these is that the direct channel linking expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio that
operates through the mechanism of wage and price stickiness appears to be more important. The
finding of a net negative relationship does not rule out positive effects emanating from the policy
channels that theory also indicates should be present. This finding does, however, suggest that these
latter policy‐based effects are of secondary empirical magnitude.
The second implication of our results derives from the immediately preceding point. As we noted in
our discussion in subsection 2.1 of the direct channel linking expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio,
traditional theories of wage and price stickiness can generate output losses from disinflations that
forward‐looking New Keynesian theories typically cannot without reference to imperfect policy
credibility. As discussed in subsection 2.2, however, a prediction of a negative relationship between
expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio is difficult to glean from a theory that relies on imperfect
policy credibility as a basis for output losses to arise from disinflations. Thus, our general finding of a
negative relationship in the data calls into question New Keynesian motivations for positive sacrifice
ratios that hinge on imperfect policy credibility. More work may be required to render forward‐looking
New Keynesian models appropriate for analyzing issues relating to output losses generated by
disinflations.
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Footnotes

1 Countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,

Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. The complete data set is available from the authors upon request.
2 We are not aware of alternative measures of inflation expectations that have the comprehensive time and
country coverage that the empirical exercise in this paper requires. When such data become available,
future research should examine whether our main findings are consistent with these data.
3 The results for peak inflation in Ball ([4]) are not statistically significant. He concludes that this is a result of the
collinearity between initial inflation and the inflation loss. Because of the way in which we measure
inflation loss, the two variables are not correlated, as shown in Table 2.
4 We also considered whether Peak and ExpInf might be mediators for the length of disinflation. Neither
variable passed all four of the tests described above nor had a statistically significant indirect effect. We
conclude that the two variables have only moderating effects on Length.

5 Due to the nature and number of data points, the influence of outliers may be an issue. As a robustness test,

we estimate a robust regression estimated at the median value. There is no significant difference in sign
or significance.
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